Several regulatory authorities worldwide have imposed forward contract commitments on electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In this paper we analyze the impact of such commitments on equilibrium outcomes in a model that re ‡ects important institutional and structural features of electricity markets. We show that, when …rms are asymmetric, the distribution of contracts amongst …rms matters. In the case of a single dominant …rm, the regulator can be con…dent that allocating contracts only to that …rm will be pro-competitive. When the asymmetries are less extreme, however, certain contract allocations can yield anticompetitive outcomes by eliminating the more competitive equilibria. Our analysis thus suggests that forward contracts should be allocated so as to (virtually) reduce asymmetries across …rms.
Introduction
Concerns over the exercise of market power in electricity markets have led several competition and regulatory authorities to impose forward contract commitments on the dominant producers. 1 Such contracts have taken various forms, but they all have one important feature in common: they commit producers to receiving a …xed price for a certain fraction of their output before wholesale market competition takes place. The 'vesting contracts'introduced at privatization in the British electricity market or the 'Competition Transition Costs'for stranded costs recovery in Spain, provide two wellknown examples of such forward commitments. 2 More recently, several regulators worldwide have been forcing large electricity producers to auction o¤ 'virtual power plants'(VPPs), which essentially work as forward sales. VPPs have also been used as antitrust remedies in several competition policy cases, including merger control proceedings and abuse of dominance investigations. 3 More generally, several authors have blamed the poor performance of some electricity markets on the lack of su¢ cient forward contracting, and propose to foster it for these markets to deliver e¢ cient outcomes (Wolak (2007b) and Bushnell et al. (2008) ).
In this paper we investigate how such forward contract commitments a¤ect …rms' strategic behavior and equilibrium outcomes in electricity markets. 4 As compared to the no-contracts case, forward contracts can potentially result in higher prices if su¢ ciently many forward contracts are awarded to …rms with little but yet some market power. However, such anti-competitive e¤ects never arise whenever contracts are awarded to the dominant …rm in the market. Therefore, the relevant question is how to allocate forward contracts among …rms to avoid their potential anti-competitive e¤ects while enhancing their pro-competitive role. In this respect, the current paper provides a clear policy answer: forward contracts should be awarded in ways that align all …rms'interests by (virtually) reducing their asymmetries. This can be achieved not only by mitigating the dominant …rms'incentives to increase prices through contract sales, but also by encouraging the medium-sized …rms to purchase such contracts in order to counterbalance the market power of the bigger …rms. 5 Our analysis re ‡ects important institutional and structural features of electricity markets. Firstly, …rms compete by submitting supply functions with a …nite number of steps, as it is the case in all 1 Market power concerns in electricity markets have also fostered the establishment and promotion of forwards markets, as in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland market (PJM) or in the Australian National Electricity Market. However, these are not the subject of this paper to the extent that participation in such markets is typically voluntary and hence endogenous. In Spain and Portugal, VPPs have also been used in an attempt to make the market more competitive. For a description and analysis of VPPs, see Schultz (2007) and Federico and López (2009) . Some unconventional forms of forward contracts have been used in other competition policy settings, such as certain voluntary operating restrictions adopted by …rms in antitrust lawsuits, see Borenstein (1996) . 4 Such contractual arrangements encompass several types of vertical commitments, including vertical integration.
To the extent that they can be considered to be exogenous (Bushnell et al. (2008) ), our paper also sheds light on their e¤ects. 5 This is in contrast to the Spanish experience with VPPs, as the medium-sized …rms were not allowed to buy such contracts.
electricity markets in practice; secondly, …rms own a portfolio of several production technologies, thus giving rise to (weakly) increasing marginal cost functions that might di¤er across …rms; and thirdly, …rms are allowed to hold exogenously given forward contracts, which are …nancially settled once the market closes. 6 Despite the complexity of the problem, we show that all the equilibria have a simple pattern: all …rms but one (referred to as non-price-setters) behave as price-takers, i.e., they produce the same as if they bid at marginal costs, 7 while the remaining …rm (referred to as the price-setter) sets the price at the level that maximizes its pro…ts over the residual demand (Theorem 1). 8 Therefore,
there are as many candidate equilibrium outcomes as …rms in the market, all of which di¤er in the identity of the price-setter. In general, the resulting equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked as, all else equal, …rms prefer to be non-price-setters rather than price-setters.
A central result of the paper is that not all candidate equilibria might be sustainable (Corollary 2). A …rm that is willing to set a very high price when everyone else behaves competitively might have incentives to deviate from any candidate equilibria at which the price-setter chooses a very low price: the deviating …rm would lose output, but such output loss might be more than compensated by the price increase. This limits the set of …rms that can act as price-setters in equilibrium.
The equilibrium set is nevertheless non-empty, as no …rm wants to deviate from the highest price candidate equilibrium (Corollary 1).
The main results of the paper are contained in Proposition 4, which shows that the impact of forward contracts on equilibrium prices derives from two e¤ects: the change in the price-setter's pro…t-maximizing price, and the change in the non-price-setters'deviation incentives. On the one hand, the price-setter's pro…t-maximizing price is lower with contracts given that market prices only a¤ect its uncovered sales. On the other hand, a lower price also makes it more attractive for a nonprice-setter to deviate to a higher price. If contracts are symmetrically distributed across symmetric …rms, the only relevant e¤ect of contracts is the one on the price-setter's pro…t-maximizing price.
Hence, an increase in contracts up to …rms'competitive quantities is unambiguously pro-competitive (Lemma 5). However, this prediction may be reversed when …rms are asymmetric, as the e¤ects of contracts on the non-price-setters'deviation incentives, and thus on equilibrium existence, start to play a role. Indeed, a novel result from the paper -namely, that an increase in the contract coverage of the price-setter can lead to higher prices-comes exactly from the impact of contracts on equilibrium existence. The increase in the price-setter's contract coverage, which lowers its pro…t-maximizing price, may trigger a deviation by some other …rm, thus making such equilibrium disappear. This result is therefore related to a shrinking of the set of equilibrium outcomes and is not a standard type of comparative static result.
The above conclusions support the main message of the paper: since contract distribution and 6 Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) also study auctions where bidders have exogenously given forward contracts. However, in that paper short-sellers face the risk of being squeezed in the secondary market, thus a¤ecting the auction itself. Short-squeezes are not an issue in our setting as electricity markets are typically very liquid and most contracts are settled by di¤erences with respect to the spot market price. 7 To be more precise, this holds true as long as no …rm has an excessive amount of contracts. Otherwise, the non-price-setters might produce in an ine¢ cient manner. This is analyzed in detail in Section 6. 8 Using data from the UK electricity market, Crawford et al. (2007) have shown that this pattern of asymmetric bidding is observed in practice.
contract volume are crucial in determining the e¤ects of forward contracts, there is scope for making them pro-competitive. In markets with large asymmetries across …rms, only the dominant …rm should be forced to hold forward contracts; getting contract volume right is less critical, as contracts in this case would at worst be ine¤ective. Regulators should be more cautious in the presence of mild asymmetries between large and medium-sized …rms, as it is in such cases when the potential anticompetitive e¤ects of contracts are more likely to arise. Still, it is in these contexts when contracts may have a stronger role to play, as encouraging the smaller …rms to purchase such contracts may further mitigate the market power of the bigger …rms.
In order to illustrate our theoretical results, we have performed a simulation exercise that uses a rich data set of the Spanish electricity market. Assuming that contract volume remains …xed while demand varies over the year, the analysis shows that the pro-competitive e¤ect of contracts dominates over the anti-competitive one. Still, the latter shows up in the simulations at certain hours, depending on contract volume and contract allocation.
There is already a large body of theoretical work on the impact of forward trading on the performance of oligopolistic markets. 9 However, existing papers are not fully applicable to the problem at hand, to the extent that they assume that ex-ante symmetric …rms choose their contracts prior to competing either à la Cournot (Allaz and Vila (1993) and Bushnell (2007) ) or à la Bertrand (Mahenc and Salanié (2004) ). 10 Instead, forward contract commitments are not endogenously chosen by …rms but rather imposed by regulators. Also, costs and capacity asymmetries are pervasive among electricity producers. These two di¤erences explain why and when our predictions di¤er. In the existing papers, and regardless of whether …rms compete à la Cournot or à la Bertrand, forward sales (purchases) induce …rms to compete (less) more …ercely given that spot market prices only a¤ect their net-selling (net-buying) positions. However, once contracts are endogenized, the Cournot model predicts that contracts are pro-competitive because all …rms are net-sellers at the subgame perfect equilibrium, whereas the opposite holds true under the Bertrand model. In contrast, our model predicts that exogenously given contracts might have anti-competitive e¤ects even if …rms are net-sellers. 11 As a by-product, our analysis also contributes to the literature on share auctions. 12 In a common value setting, Wilson (1979) shows that there exist equilibria with prices below the common value. Kremer and Nyborg (2004) demonstrate that these kind of equilibria can be eliminated in a discrete setting, similar to the one employed in the current paper, where quantities must be discrete though prices need not. Restricting bidders to submit a …nite number of price-quantity pairs implies that there is a positive mass at the margin, so that competition for the margin destroys the underpricing 9 There is also extensive empirical literature which con…rms that contracts a¤ect the performance of spot markets. (2006)), and tend to conclude that they have anti-competitive e¤ects. 1 1 It is simple to show that, in a Cournot model with exogenously given contracts and asymmetric …rms, forward contracting is always (weakly) pro-competitive, regardless of contract distribution. 1 2 In most of the papers in this literature, bidders submit demand functions (to buy some underlying good) rather than supply functions (to supply electricity), as in the current paper. However, as it is well known, whether one casts the model in terms of demand or supply functions is immaterial because demand and supply games are isomorphic.
equilibria found by Wilson. In the current paper, in contrast, bidders can exploit the fact that (weakly) increasing marginal costs lead to downward sloping residual demand functions, in the same way as bidders can engage in demand reduction in a setting à la Wilson (see also Ausubel and Cramton (2002) ). In sum, by relaxing the ‡at common value assumption, our paper recovers the ine¢ ciencies in Wilson in a discrete setting à la Kremer and Nyborg. 13 The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general model, a simple example of which is solved in Section 3. Sections 4 to 6 are devoted to the analysis of the general model, including the characterization of …rms'optimal behavior, equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium existence and multiplicity, and the impact of forward contracts. Section 7 contains a simulation exercise, while Section 8 concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
Description of the Model
We consider a model in which N 2 …rms compete to supply a perfectly divisible good. Market demand, D(p); can be either price-inelastic or downward-sloping, D 0 (p) 0; and its inverse function is denoted P (q).
Firm n's productive capacity K n ; n = 1; :::; N; is made up of several units. Each unit has constant marginal costs of production up to its capacity limit. We impose no constraints on the number of units …rms have (other than it must be …nite), and allow for all types of asymmetries (both in size and cost) among the units owned by a …rm, as well as across …rms. By stacking …rm n's units in increasing cost order, we construct its marginal cost curve, c n (q); which is a leftcontinuous non-decreasing step function. 14 We use C n (q) to denote …rm n's cost function, i.e.,
In line with the literature on electricity auctions, we assume that information on …rms'costs is complete because electricity generators share similar production technologies, and are thus well aware of the e¢ ciencies of their plants and the cost of the fuels.
Firms compete by simultaneously submitting a …nite number of price-quantity pairs. Prices cannot exceed the 'market-reserve price'p R (which, for simplicity but without loss of generality, is assumed to exceed the highest marginal cost), and …rms cannot produce above their capacities. Note that restricting …rms to submit a …nite number of price-quantity pairs implies that …rms'strategies are left-continuous non-decreasing step functions with a …nite number of steps. We assume that both the "height" (prices) and "length" (quantities) of the steps are continuous choice variables.
By ordering …rms'price-quantity pairs in increasing price order, we construct their bid functions, i.e., for …rm n; b n = f(p ns ; q ns )g s s=1 ; p ns 2 0; p R with p ns+1 p ns ; q ns+1 q ns with q n s K n ; 1 3 To be sure, the reasons why we recover the underpricing equilibria are similar to the ones that explain why the competitive outcome is not sustainable under Bertrand competition with capacity constraints, even though it constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome under pure Bertrand competition. Within the electricity auctions literature, simpli…ed versions of our model also lead to a similar prediction (von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), García-Díaz and )). 1 4 As will become clear in Section 4, the possibility that …rms have increasing marginal cost functions is a key ingredient of the model, as it implies that …rms face step-wise downward sloping residual demand functions when rival …rms bid at marginal costs.
where s < 1 is the maximum number of admissible steps in a …rm's bid function. Consistently with actual rules in electricity markets, we will assume that the number of admissible steps does not constrain …rms from bidding each unit at its own marginal cost, i.e., s is large enough so as to allow …rms to at least replicate their marginal cost curves. 15 At each step s in …rm n's bid function, p ns speci…es the minimum price at which the …rm is willing to produce up to quantity q ns . For a given bid pro…le b = fb n g N n=1 ; we construct the aggregate supply function, denoted S (q) ; which determines the lowest price at which all …rms in the market are willing to produce up to quantity q:
The stop-out price, p , at which all transactions take place, is de…ned as follows,
In words, the stop-out price p is the point on the aggregate supply function, S (q), at which the market clears. If the demand function P (q) is downward-sloping, it need not always intersect the (possibly) discontinuous aggregate supply function, in which case p is the highest price on the aggregate supply function at which there is excess demand. To the contrary, if demand is inelastic, there are potentially many market-clearing prices when the demand function intersects the supply function at the right end of a step. In this case, p is the lowest price at which the market clears, given that it must be on the (left-continuous) aggregate supply function. 16 Firms are called to produce in increasing price order up to p . We use q n to denote the quantity allocated to …rm n: If there is excess supply at p ; we assume e¢ cient rationing on-the-margin, i.e., if several units have been bid at p , they split residual demand proportionally to the quantities o¤ered at exactly p , unless their marginal costs di¤er, in which case the low cost units are dispatched …rst. 17 By using e¢ cient rationing, the set of equilibria of our game approximates the set of equilibria of a game in which rationing pro-rata on-the margin is used but where …rms choose their bid prices on a …nite grid, which is what occurs in real markets. In contrast, assuming rationing pro-rata on-the margin in our set-up would lead to a problem of non-existence of equilibrium similar to the one that arises under a Bertrand game with asymmetric costs.
We label prices and quantities as either competitive or non-competitive. The competitive price, denoted p c ; is the point on the aggregate cost function at which demand and competitive supply intersect. As before, if they do not intersect, we assume that p c is the highest price on the aggregate 1 5 The limit on the number of bids is typically set for each production unit rather than at the …rm level. For instance, in the original market design in England and Wales, …rms were allowed to submit up to 3 incremental prices per unit; up to 25 price-quantity pairs per unit in Spain; and up to 40 per unit in Texas. In practice, …rms use even fewer bidpoints than the ones they are allowed to (Hortacsu and Puller (2008) ). 1 6 These assumptions are consistent with most auction rules in practice. For instance, in the Spanish electricity market, demand bids cannot determine the stop-out price (see www.omel.es). The fact that the auctioneer chooses the lowest market-clearing price whenever there are multiple market-clearing prices is reasonable to the extent that it is the most favourable one from consumers'point of view. This is also assumed in Kremer and Nyborg (2004) and Kastl (2008) -note however that in these papers the stop-out price is assumed to be the highest market-clearing price as the auctioneer is selling rather than buying the underlying good. 1 7 Several papers in the electricity auctions literature also assume e¢ cient rationing on-the-margin (see García-Díaz and Marín (2003) and Fabra et al. (2006) , among others). Instead, papers in the Treasury auctions literature typically adopt the rationing pro rata on-the-margin rule, which rations the marginal bids at p proportionally to the total quantity o¤ered at exactly p ; regardless of their marginal costs (see Back and Zender (1993) and Kastl (2008) , among others).
cost function at which there is excess demand. Formally,
The resulting competitive quantities are denoted (q c 1 ; :::; q c N ). All other prices and quantities are referred to as non-competitive. Similar labels are used to classify market outcomes.
An important feature of the model is that …rms might be subject to forward contracts. We use n to denote …rm n's contract price, and x n 0 to denote …rm n's contract quantity; 18 both n and x n are …xed when …rms submit their bids. Consequently, when the stop-out price is p and …rm n's dispatched quantity is q n ; …rm n's pro…ts are given by
where the …rst two terms give the …rm's market pro…ts, and the last term gives the …rm's contract pro…ts. 19 To …x ideas, one can think of these contracts as being purely …nancial, i.e., …rm n continues to supply all its quantity q n to the market at p and the contract's counterpart, e.g. a big customer, continues to buy all its demand from the market at p . The contract requires …rm n to pay (receive) the di¤erence between the contract price and the stop-out price times the contract quantity, [ n p ] x n ; whenever positive (negative). Re-writing the above expression as
shows that …rms'bidding incentives depend on their net-positions, [q n x n ] ; which are positive for the net-sellers, q n > x n ; and negative for the net-buyers, q n < x n . The last term, n x n ; is …xed when …rms compete in the spot market; as such, it has no e¤ect on bidding incentives (indeed, one could set n = 0 without loss of generality). We will assume that total contract volume never exceeds demand at the competitive price, P n x n D (p c ) ; thus ruling out the cases in which x n q c n holds for all …rms n (with at least one strict inequality). Firm n's problem is to choose a …nite number of price-quantity pairs that maximize n given its rivals' supply functions. We focus on Nash equilibria in pure strategies. All aspects of the model are common knowledge among …rms. 20 Before we proceed, it is convenient to set some terminology and notation. We …rst de…ne which …rms are marginal : 1 8 We adopt the convention that xn > 0 corresponds to …rm n selling contracts (i.e., taking a short-position). We do not allow …rms to buy forward contracts since in real markets regulators typically impose sale obligations. 1 9 In models of vertical integration, the …rst two terms would represent the pro…ts of the upstream subsidiary, while the third term would accrue to the downstream subsidiary. 2 0 When applied to electricity markets, it could be argued that …rms face demand uncertainty (or demand variation)
at the bidding stage. However, this issue depends on the duration of bids as compared to the frequency of market clearing: for instance, when …rms' submit supply functions that remain valid for a single period of market clearing, there will be little or no relevant variation in demand; however, with bids that remain good for a whole day, demand will vary considerably over the pricing period. Accordingly, our paper applies to the …rst case, which is typically referred to as the short-lived bids case (as opposed to the second case, referred to as long-lived bids case). The former is in place in most electricity markets in practice (see Fabra et al. (2006) and García-Díaz and Marín (2003)). Last, the contracting stage may be a¤ected by demand variation, as contracts typically remain …xed for longer periods of time. However, this has no e¤ect on the bidding stage as long as the features described above are met.
De…nition 1
For an arbitrary bid function pro…le resulting in an outcome fp ; (q 1 ; :::; q N )g ; …rm n is marginal if its bid function has some step s at the stop-out price, p ns = p :
We use the above de…nition to also classify …rms as either price-setters or non-price-setters: 21 De…nition 2 For an arbitrary bid function pro…le resulting in an outcome fp ; (q 1 ; :::; q N )g ; …rm n is a price-setter if it is a marginal …rm and if it is at least partly dispatching its marginal step, q n 2 (q ns 1; q ns ]. Otherwise, …rm n is a non-price-setter.
Finally, both the stop-out price and the dispatched quantities depend on the demand, D(p); and the bid function pro…le, b. However, in order to simplify notation, we suppress these arguments whenever clear from the context.
Illustrative Example
We start by analyzing a simple example to convey the intuitions of the main results of the paper. In particular, we …x N = 2 and assume that demand is perfectly inelastic at D = 3: There exist four types of units, each with capacity normalized to one, whose marginal costs are 0, 1, 2 or 2:5. We …rst show that in the absence of contracts, the competitive outcome cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Suppose that both …rms bid at marginal costs, b n = c n ; n = 1; 2; so that the aggregate supply function is S = f(0; 2) ; (1; 4) ; (2; 5) ; (2:5; 7)g. Since the auctioneer has to dispatch three units to satisfy demand, the competitive outcome is fp c = 1; (q c 1 = 1:5; q c 2 = 1:5)g ; with pro…ts c n = 1; n = 1; 2: If …rm 1 deviates to bidding all its units at 2:5; i.e., b 0 1 = f(2:5; 4)g ; the aggregate supply function becomes S 0 = f(0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (2:5; 7)g ; the stop-out price is raised to p = 2:5, and …rms'dispatched quantities are q 1 = 1 and q 2 = 2 (by the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule, …rm 1's …rst unit is dispatched at capacity, as it has lower marginal costs than any of the other units that tie at the margin). Thus, …rm 1 makes a larger pro…t, 0 1 = 2:5 > c 1 ; and …rm 2 gains even more,
Note that one can also rule out existence of a competitive equilibrium by letting …rm 2 deviate from marginal cost bidding. In this case, …rm 2 would optimally raise the price to 2; e.g. by bidding at b 0 2 = f(2; 2); (2:5; 3)g ; in order to increase its pro…ts to 0 2 = 2 > c 2 ; again, the other …rm gains even more, 0 1 = 3 > c 1 : Thus, the competitive outcome cannot be sustained in equilibrium, unless …rms used weakly-dominated strategies, a possibility ruled out throughout the paper.
The two bid function pro…les considered above, fb 0 1 ; c 2 g and fc 1 ; b 0 2 g, are indeed in equilibrium. Under both pro…les, one …rm is setting the stop-out price at the level that maximizes its pro…ts over its residual demand (which coincides with the marginal cost of its rival's …rst undispatched unit), while the other …rm cannot increase its pro…ts as it is producing the maximum it can without 2 1 We have inherited the price-setter and non-price-setter terminology from Crawford et al. (2007) . incurring in losses. The two equilibria are not outcome equivalent, as the …rst results in a high price, p = 2:5; while the second results in a lower price, p = 2. However, none of them can be ruled out by appealing to Pareto dominance, given that each …rm is strictly better-o¤ when the rival sets the price. 22 To see this, recall that at the …rst equilibrium …rms'pro…ts are 1 = 2:5 and 2 = 4, whereas at the second …rms'pro…ts are 1 = 3 and 2 = 2. 23 Besides the two equilibria described above, there are many other equilibrium bid pro…les; in particular, there exist several equilibria with both …rms bidding above marginal costs. The reason for this multiplicity is that several bids are outcome irrelevant. However, conditionally on the identity of the …rm that sets the price, all equilibria are outcome equivalent to the two equilibria just described. In sum, even though the strategy space is quite large, we need just focus on candidate equilibrium outcomes, of which there are at most as many as …rms in the market.
To illustrate the impact of contracts, let us …rst allocate all contracts to the large …rm, x 1 2 (1; 2] > x 2 = 0: If …rm 2 bids at marginal costs, …rm 1's pro…t-maximizing price now equals p = 1 rather than p = 2:5: To see this, note that if …rm 1 sets the stop-out price at p = 2:5; it now becomes a net-buyer with x 1 > q 1 = 1. As such, it prefers to reduce the price to p = 1 by e.g. bidding at marginal costs. Indeed, since marginal cost bidding allows …rm 1 to save the price di¤erence over its net-buying position, its pro…ts increase by [1 2:5] [1 x 1 ] > 0: Therefore, the equilibrium at which …rm 1 sets the price at p = 2:5 can no longer be sustained, whereas the equilibrium at which …rm 2 sets the price at p = 2 can still be sustained (…rm 2's incentives are unchanged as it has no contracts, while …rm 1 does not …nd it pro…table to reduce the price as at this equilibrium it is no longer a net-buyer, x 1 q 1 = 2). Since only the low-price equilibrium outcome survives, allocating contracts to the large …rm is pro-competitive.
Alternatively, let us now allocate all contracts to the small …rm, x 2 2 (1; 2] > x 1 = 0: By the same logic, the equilibrium with …rm 2 setting the price at p = 2 disappears: as a net-buyer, …rm 2 would rather bid at marginal costs in order to reduce the price from p = 2 to p = 1. However, …rm 1 would then respond by setting the price at p = 2:5, which implies that the only surviving equilibrium outcome is the one with the high price. Hence, forward contracts are anti-competitive in this case. Table 1 summarizes these results.
To sum-up, this example illustrates that the impact of forward contracts on bidding incentives and equilibrium outcomes critically depends on its distribution among …rms. Even though contracts reduce …rms'incentives to increase prices, equilibrium prices need not be lower as contracts might also jeopardize the existence of the equilibria in which the contracted …rm sets the price. Indeed, contracts might lead to (weakly) higher prices whenever they are awarded in su¢ ciently large quan- 2 2 We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that, in some pathological examples, the low-price equilibrium is (weakly) Pareto dominated by the high-price equilibrium. This may occur when the length and height of …rms' marginal cost functions equal one and demand is an integer, so that a …rm might be indi¤erent between being a nonprice-setter and selling one more unit at a lower price, or being a price-setter and selling one unit less at a higher price. For instance, in this example, if the high marginal cost equals 3 rather than 2:5, the high price equilibrium becomes p = 3; with 1 = 3 and 2 = 5 so that the low-price equilibrium is now weakly Pareto dominated. However, this Pareto ranking is not robust to slight perturbations. If this marginal cost equals 3 " (for " small enough) instead of 3, or if demand is 3 " instead of 3, then …rm 1 would strictly prefer to be a non-price-setter rather than a price-setter and the two equilibria can no longer be Pareto ranked. 2 3 This also implies that both equilibria are coalition-proof (see Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) ).
Equilibrium Prices
No contracts
Firm i is large f2:5; 2g f?; 2g
Firm i is small f2; 2:5g f?; 2:5g tity to the …rm that would set lower prices without contracts (in this example, the small …rm). Let us note that this e¤ect can only be uncovered once the symmetry assumption is relaxed, as otherwise the equilibrium price would be the same regardless of which …rm sets prices, and hence regardless of whether contracts are allocated to one …rm, to the other, or to none.
Analysis of the Model
In this section, we characterize equilibrium bidding behavior and equilibrium outcomes in the general model. Rather than deriving equilibrium strategies, we instead deduce structural features that any equilibrium must have. As it is common in the analysis of uniform-price auctions, we …rst re…ne the equilibrium set by restricting attention to strategies that are not weakly-dominated. In the absence of contracts, bidding below marginal costs is a weakly-dominated strategy (García-Díaz and Marín Lemma 1 For …rm n; it is weakly-dominated (i) to bid below marginal costs for quantities above its contract cover, q n > x n , as well as (ii) to bid above marginal costs for quantities not exceeding its contract cover, q n < x n :
In words, weak-dominance arguments eliminate below marginal cost bidding only for quantities above the …rm's contract cover, q n > x n ; i.e., such that the …rm is a net-seller. 24 At lower quantities, the …rm is a net-buyer, and as such it would like to exercise monopsony power by bidding some units below marginal cost. Consistently with this, weak-dominance arguments also eliminate above marginal cost bidding for quantities below the …rm's contract cover, q n < x n . We cannot rule out either below or above marginal cost bidding for q n = x n because bid functions are step functions.
With continuous bid functions instead, bidding q n = x n at marginal costs would be a dominant
strategy.
In what follows, we will …rst …x the identity of the price-setter in order to characterize the non-price-setters'optimal bidding behavior. 2 4 Kastl (2008) shows that in discrete multi-unit uniform-price auctions, a rational bidder (without contracts) may submit a bid above its marginal valuation (in the current paper, a bid below marginal costs). This occurs only when the number of admissible steps in the bid functions is lower than the number of units, as it implies that bidders have to bundle bids for several units together. However, this does not arise in our paper given that, consistently with practice, bidders can at least submit as many bids as units they own.
Lemma 2 At any Nash Equilibrium in which …rm i is a price-setter, all other …rms j; j 6 = i; are fully dispatching all their units with marginal costs strictly below the equilibrium price p :
The intuition underlying Lemma 2 above is simple. Given that …rm i is dispatching some output at p , it cannot be the case that some other …rm j; j 6 = i; has some unit with marginal costs strictly below p that has not been called to produce. If it instead bid such an undispatched unit slightly below p , …rm j would earn a positive pro…t margin over its increased production, with only (if any) a slight reduction in the price. Key to this result is the fact that …rms submit a …nite number of price-quantity pairs, which implies that there is a positive output mass at the margin. Hence, when …rm j reduces its bid, the quantity gain always outweighs the price reduction as the latter can be made arbitrarily small.
Lemma 3 At any Nash Equilibrium in which …rm i is a price-setter, …rm j; j 6 = i; is not dispatching any unit with marginal costs strictly above the equilibrium price p if either one of the following two conditions holds:
1) …rm j is a net-seller or has a balanced position, i.e., q j x j ; or 2) there is at least one marginal …rm that is not fully dispatching its marginal step, i.e., p = p ks and q k < q ks ; k 6 = j.
By elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, net-sellers cannot sell their marginal output below marginal costs. Similarly, …rms with a balanced position do not …nd it pro…table to bid below marginal costs in equilibrium given that by bidding at marginal costs they could save the di¤erence between their marginal costs and the equilibrium price times their reduced output. Hence, q j x j is su¢ cient to guarantee that …rm j does not dispatch any unit with marginal costs below p .
The same result does not apply in general to an equilibrium in which …rm j is a net-buyer, unless some other …rm k has bid some step at p which has not been fully dispatched (i.e., p = p ks and q k < q ks ). When this is the case, …rm j can avoid producing at a loss by bidding some of its output slightly above p ; with no e¤ect on the price. However, if all the marginal …rms are fully dispatching their marginal steps, …rm j may be unable to reduce its production so as to avoid productive losses unless it raises the price high enough. As …rm j is a net-buyer, the price increase -which may no longer be in…nitesimal -may reduce the …rm's pro…ts (…rm j reduces productive losses but buys its negative net position at a higher price). There is hence no guarantee that in an equilibrium in which …rm i is a price-setter, the other …rms produce in an e¢ cient manner unless they are all net-sellers.
Note that this result only arises with contracts as, otherwise, all …rms would trivially be net-sellers.
The next Proposition combines the two lemmas above to provide conditions under which at any equilibria the non-price-setters behave as if they were price-takers. This does not imply that they do not act strategically; to the contrary, the non-price-setters are the ones that bene…t the most from the (potential) exercise of market power, while the price-setters must bear the cost.
Proposition 1 At any Nash Equilibrium in which …rm i is a price-setter, …rm j; j 6 = i; produces the same "as if" it were bidding at marginal costs if either one of the two conditions in the statement of Lemma 3 hold.
The conditions under which Proposition 1 holds relate to equilibrium features, which are endogenous, such as the identity of the price-setter or the non-price-setters'equilibrium net-positions.
Nevertheless, one can guarantee that at any equilibrium Proposition 1 always holds if all …rms are net-sellers at the competitive outcome. This condition relates to the primitives of the game, which are no longer endogenous.
To see why this is the case, note that weak-dominance arguments imply that if x n < q c n holds for all …rms, they must all bid their competitive quantities at or above marginal costs. Therefore, the equilibrium price p cannot be lower than p c . This implies that those …rms that bid at marginal costs must be producing more than at the competitive outcome, and are thus net-sellers; while those …rms that bid above marginal costs must also be net-sellers by elimination of weakly-dominated strategies.
Therefore, since condition 1) of Lemma 3 is satis…ed, Proposition 1 applies.
In contrast, Proposition 1 does not generally hold if some …rms are net-buyers at the competitive outcome. First, since p p c cannot be ruled out, even the …rms that are bidding at marginal costs may produce below their competitive quantities, and hence remain/become net-buyers. Moreover, even if p > p c ; and some …rms expand production above their competitive quantities, such an increase in quantity might not be enough so as to exceed their contract positions.
For these reasons, it will be useful to analyze these two cases separately, which we respectively refer to as the regular cases (in which x n < q c n for all …rms) and the irregular cases (in which x n < q c n holds for some but not all …rms). Arguably, the regular cases are the empirically most relevant ones (in practice, regulators never force …rms to holding contracts above their competitive quantities), but for completeness we will also cover the irregular cases in Section 6.
Regular Cases
We start the analysis of the regular cases by identifying conditions under which the competitive outcome constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome of the game. On the one hand, we provide primitives of the game which are su¢ cient for all …rms to behave competitively. On the other hand, we derive properties of the equilibrium bid pro…les that sustain the competitive outcome.
Proposition 2 Let x n < q c n hold for all …rms. (i) If for any n; all …rms but …rm n can jointly serve total competitive demand D (p c ) without losses, then the competitive outcome, p = p c and q n = q c n for all n; is the unique equilibrium outcome.
(ii) Whenever there is supply rationing at p c , any Nash equilibrium results in the competitive outcome if and only if there is more than one price-setter.
If every possible combination of (N 1) …rms can jointly serve total demand at the competitive price, the residual demand faced by the N th …rm would fall down to zero if it deviated optimally from the competitive equilibrium. Hence, all …rms have no option but to behave competitively. If this condition did not hold, the N th …rm would have the possibility of manipulating the price up a notch. If such a …rm is marginal at the competitive outcome, it will certainly bid above marginal costs in order to make pro…ts out of its marginal output. However, if it is not marginal, meaning that it is making strictly positive pro…ts out of all its dispatched units, it might not …nd it pro…table to deviate if the losses from reducing output exceed the gains due to the price increase. Hence, while the condition in part (i) of Proposition 2 above is su¢ cient for the competitive outcome to emerge, it is nevertheless not necessary.
But for knife-edge cases with no supply rationing at p c , the coexistence of multiple price-setters is both necessary and su¢ cient for the competitive outcome to be sustainable. If there was only one price-setter, its bid would determine the stop-out price, and the …rm would have incentives to engage in supply reduction. 25 The upshot of this is that with multiple price-setters, the equilibrium must be competitive as any of them would otherwise gain by slightly undercutting the price in order to achieve a positive increase in output. It follows that there cannot occur (payo¤-relevant) ties at the margin among dispatched units, unless the equilibrium is competitive. In contrast, ties at the equilibrium price with only one …rm dispatching output at the margin will be (almost always) the rule. This will be clearly the case with inelastic demand, as the price-setter will optimally drive the price up to the next step in its rivals'bid functions. 26 The reason why the statement of part (ii) does not include certain knife-edge cases is simple.
If there was no supply rationing at p c , there could exist equilibria with p > p c with ties at the margin, as long as …rms still produce their competitive quantities. Since all …rms are rationed at p c ; they would also be rationed at prices slightly above p c ; and would hence have no incentives to …ght for market share at the margin. One simple example in which this is the case has D = 2, c 1 = c 2 = f(0; 1)g and c 3 = f(c; 1)g : In equilibrium, p = c > 0 = p c while q n = q c n = 1 for n = 1; 2; and q 3 = q c 3 = 0: Both …rms 1 and 2 could be price-setters if they bid at b 1 = b 2 = f(c; 1)g ; but the same outcome would also arise with just one of them bidding at c while the other bids below.
In this sense, if there is no supply rationing at p c , ties at the margin among dispatched units can occur in equilibrium, but such ties are payo¤ irrelevant.
An important consequence of Proposition 2 is that at any non-competitive Nash equilibrium, there is a unique price-setter. This fact allows us to proceed by …xing the identity of the price-setter and treating all other …rms as non-price-setters. This approach is appropriate even for competitive equilibria, as there would be more than one price-setter (Proposition 2) but they would also behave as non-price-setters in equilibrium (Proposition 1).
The non-price-setters'and the price-setter' s optimal behavior
In order to derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium bidding, we will …rst characterize …rms'optimal bidding behavior conditional on their identities.
By Proposition 1, we already know that the non-price-setters behave as price-takers, i.e., they have to decide how much to produce at a given stop-out price, p . Formally, 2 5 Arguments here are identical to those in Ausubel and Cramton (2002) to get optimal demand reduction in uniformprice auctions. 2 6 With a rationing pro rata on-the-margin rule, such a tie at the margin would not arise. Nevertheless, the outcome would (almost perfectly) approximate the equilibrium outcome under the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule. Note that if the tie-breaking rule did not allocate the marginal output to the low cost …rm …rst, such a …rm would avoid the tie by bidding slightly below its rivals'…rst non-accepted bid.
where
Note that, in order to produce q N P S j (p ) ; the non-price-setters can bid at marginal costs or use any other outcome equivalent strategy. However, their choice of bidding strategies is not irrelevant, as these determine the shape of the residual demand faced by the price-setter and hence its optimal bidding behavior. For this reason, we will not assume that the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs, unless we make it explicit. It follows that we can readily compute the price-setter's production in equilibrium, but not outside the equilibrium. In particular, at any candidate equilibrium with p = p c ; the price-setter produces q c i ; while if p > p c ; given that the market must clear, the price-setter produces
However, the above equation might not be satis…ed at prices other than the equilibrium price, given that the non-price-setters need not be bidding at marginal costs outside the equilibrium, and given that the market need not always clear.
The nature of the price-setter's problem clearly di¤ers from that of the non-price-setters'. Instead of choosing how much to produce at a given price, the price-setter behaves as if it were to choose the stop-out price that maximizes its pro…ts over its residual demand, i.e., total demand minus the quantity that the non-price-setters are willing to supply at each price. Formally,
and,
Since both the cost function and the residual demand faced by the price-setter are step-functions, its pro…t function may fail to be di¤erentiable, so that the price-setter's pro…t-maximizing price might not be obtained as the solution to a …rst order condition. Therefore, in order to understand the price-setter's bidding incentives, consider the change in …rm i's pro…ts when it raises the stop-out price from p to some p 0 > p ,
As in any standard monopoly problem, a price increase implies greater revenues through the …rm's net-position -the …rst term in (4), -but it also implies a pro…t loss due to the output reduction -the second term in (4). Accordingly, the price-setter's incentives to raise the price are stronger the bigger its net-position is, the less elastic its residual demand is, and the smaller the price-cost margin on its lost production is. It then follows that …rm i's pro…t-maximizing price given its rivals' strategies, p P S i (b i ) ; is non-increasing in its contract cover, x i : This mimics the standard result that smaller …rms (here, …rms with smaller net-positions) have weaker incentives to raise prices.
We conclude this subsection by comparing the price-setter's and non-price-setters' pro…ts. To simplify notation, we will write P S i (p ) and N P S j (p ) ; for j 6 = i; to respectively denote the pricesetter's and non-price-setters'pro…ts when the former sets the stop-out price at p and all the latter produce q N P S j (p ).
Lemma 4 Let x n < q c n hold for all …rms. For any stop-out price p ; (i) the non-price-setters'pro…ts N P S j (p ) are increasing in p ; and (ii) they weakly exceed those they would get as a price-setter at the same stop-out price, P S i (p )
Since under the regular cases all …rms are net-sellers in equilibrium, any price increase makes the non-price-setters strictly better-o¤. Because of this, we will assume that whenever the price-setter is indi¤erent between multiple prices, it always chooses the highest one as it is the Pareto dominant one. By de…nition, the price-setter is indi¤erent between these prices, but the non-price-setters are strictly better o¤ when the highest maximizer is chosen (as shown in Lemma 4 above). Finally, the pro…ts that a …rm earns as a non-price-setter are bounded below by the pro…ts it could obtain as a price-setter: both the non-price-setters and the price-setter are paid the same price, but the price-setter sells (weakly) less and thus gives up a positive pro…t margin on its reduced production.
Equilibrium characterization
We have already characterized …rms'optimal behavior conditional on their identities, but the equilibrium characterization also requires an assessment of whether the price-setter prefers to become a non-price-setter and vice-versa. An equilibrium outcome is a collection of quantities produced by the non-price-setters and a price chosen by the price-setter such that no …rm wants to deviate, either by changing its quantity or price choice, or by changing its identity. The following Theorem provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium bidding in the regular cases.
Theorem 1 Let x n < q c n hold for all …rms. A strategy pro…le b constitutes a Nash equilibrium in which …rm i is the price-setter if and only if the following three conditions hold:
In equilibrium, the price-setter chooses the price that maximizes its pro…ts over the residual
By weak-dominance arguments, it must be either equal or above the competitive price. All the other …rms must behave as price-takers given p ; and hence produce the same as if they were bidding at marginal costs (Proposition 1).
By condition 1) of Theorem 1 above, all …rms are already optimizing conditionally on their identities. Thus, the only relevant deviations are those by which …rms reverse their identities. Since the price-setter might consider becoming a non-price-setter in order to sell more at a lower stop-out price, 27 condition 2) is needed to rule out such deviations. In turn, since all the non-price-setters are net-sellers in equilibrium, those with pro…t-maximizing prices no larger than p never …nd it optimal to deviate: not only they would sell their production at a (weakly) lower price, but they would also sell less. Hence, the only relevant deviations are those by the remaining non-price-setters, but condition 3) rules them out.
Equilibrium existence and multiplicity
For a given price-setter, there exist multiple bid function pro…les that constitute an equilibrium (all those satisfying Theorem 1). This derives from the fact that …rms only care about one point in their bid functions, the one corresponding to the stop-out price. Furthermore, the multiplicity of equilibrium bid functions may pave the way for multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes to emerge.
Fortunately, this is not the case, as stated next. 28 Proposition 3 (i) There exists an equilibrium in which …rm i is the price-setter if and only if the equilibrium in which …rm i sets the price at p = p P S i (c i ) while all the other …rms bid at marginal costs exists. (ii) Furthermore, if there also exist other equilibria in which …rm i is the price-setter, the one above is the Pareto dominant one.
Proposition 3 implies that, conditionally on the identity of the price-setter, there is no loss of generality (as far as equilibrium outcomes are concerned) in restricting attention to equilibria in which the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs and the price-setter maximizes its pro…ts over the resulting residual demand. This claim is supported by two important facts: if such an equilibrium does not exist, there does not exist any other equilibrium in which the same …rm acts a the pricesetter; while if it exists, it is either the unique equilibrium or the Pareto dominant one.
The next result, which is a corollary of Theorem 1, guarantees equilibrium existence. In particular, the candidate equilibrium with the highest price always exists.
Corollary 1
The equilibrium with p = max i p P S i (c i ) always exists.
So far, we have shown that, conditionally on the identity of the price-setter, equilibrium multiplicity is irrelevant for equilibrium outcomes. However, the multiplicity of equilibria that di¤er in the identity of the price-setter might potentially result in di¤erent equilibrium prices. This multiplicity was highlighted in the illustrative example provided in Section 3 but it holds more generally.
Furthermore, existence of a candidate equilibrium implies that all other candidate equilibria with higher equilibrium prices also exist. To understand this, note that the pro…ts that a …rm achieves as a price-setter are given, but the pro…ts it makes as a non-price-setter are increasing in the equilibrium price (Lemma 4). Hence, if none of the …rms has incentives to deviate from a candidate equilibrium, it must also be the case that none of them wants to deviate from a candidate equilibrium with a higher price. For similar reasons, if a candidate equilibrium does not exist, there does not exist any other candidate equilibrium with a lower price. These results are stated in the last corollary of Theorem 1. 2 8 In contrast, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes is pervasive in auctions with continuous bid functions (seeWilson (1979), Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Back and Zender (1993) , among others). See also the analysis of the irregular cases in Section 6, which also give rise to multiple equilibria.
Corollary 2 If the equilibrium with p = p P S i (c i ) exists, the equilibria with p = p P S n (c n ) p P S i (c i ) also exist. Alternatively, if it does not exist, the equilibria with p = p P S n (c n ) p P S i (c i ) do not exist either, n = 1; :::; N:
Combining the two corollaries above, it follows that under the same primitives of the game, a competitive equilibrium cannot coexist with a non-competitive equilibrium.
The impact of forward contracts
We are now ready to analyze the impact of forward contract commitments on equilibrium outcomes.
To do so, we will focus on those cases under which the equilibrium is non-competitive in the absence of contracts. The reason is two-fold: …rst, these are indeed the cases under which forward contract commitments are used by regulators in practice; and second, if the equilibrium was competitive even without contracts, introducing them would trivially make no di¤erence. Since our aim is to perform comparative statics with respect to changes in contracts, in what follows, with some abuse of notation, we will write p P S i (x i ) to denote the pro…t-maximizing price of …rm i when its rivals bid at marginal costs and its contract obligation is x i : We will also index …rms according to their pro…t-maximizing prices at the no-contracts case, i.e., p P S 1 (0) p P S 2 (0) ::: p P S N (0) : 29 Suppose …rst that …rms are symmetric in all respects. The next lemma characterizes the impact on prices and productive e¢ ciency of increasing total contracts when they are either symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed among …rms.
Lemma 5
In a symmetric oligopoly, (i) If forward contracts are equally distributed among …rms, i.e., x 1 = ::: = x N = x < q c ; equilibrium prices are non-increasing in x and productive e¢ ciency is non-decreasing in x:
(ii) If forward contracts are not equally distributed among …rms, the highest equilibrium price is (weakly) higher and its associated productive e¢ ciency is (weakly) lower than under the equal contract distribution.
Since …rms are fully symmetric, there exist N price-equivalent equilibrium outcomes that only di¤er in the identity of the price-setter. As …rms'contract cover is increased, the equilibrium price is reduced and productive e¢ ciency is improved. 30 Furthermore, any departure from the symmetric contract distribution would weaken the positive e¤ect of contracts as …rms'ex-ante symmetry, which induces more competitive outcomes, would no longer be preserved. We next allow for all types of asymmetries among …rms, and perform comparative statics with respect to contract volume up to …rms' competitive quantities, depending on the distribution of contracts across …rms. 2 9 With inelastic demand and ‡at cost functions, the pro…t-maximizing price of all …rms would be the same, as it would be equal to the price cap. Hence, contracts would have an e¤ect on equilibrium existence (as shown in Proposition 4 below), but this e¤ect would not be re ‡ected in equilibrium prices. 3 0 In contrast, if total contract volume was further increased (taking us away from the regular cases), …rms would start exercising monopsony power, leading to prices below the competitive price. Furthermore, since the price-setter would produce more than at the competitive outcome, productive ine¢ ciencies might emerge.
Proposition 4
Consider an asymmetric oligopoly, such that at the no-contracts case equilibrium prices are p P S 1 (0) ; :::; p P S i (0) for 1 i N; while prices p P S n (0) for i < n N cannot be sustained because …rm 1 would deviate.
(i) If forward contracts are awarded to …rm 1 only, prices are (weakly) lower than at the nocontracts case. Furthermore, a (weak) non-monotonic relationship between contract volume and equilibrium prices may arise.
(ii) If forward contracts are awarded to …rm i only, there exists x 0 i 2 (0; q c i ) ; such that any contract allocation x i < x 0 i leads to (weakly) lower prices than at the no-contracts case, whereas any contract allocation x i x 0 i leads to (weakly) higher prices. Hence, there is a (weak) non-monotonic relationship between contract volume and equilibrium prices.
(iii) If forward contracts are awarded to …rms n > i only, they have no e¤ ect on equilibrium outcomes.
At the no-contracts case, …rm 1 and …rm i set the highest and lowest equilibrium prices respectively, while …rms n > i behave as price-takers at any equilibrium. Accordingly, we say that …rm 1 and …rm i have 'high' and 'low' market power respectively, while …rms n > i have 'no' market power at all. The impact of forward contracts on equilibrium prices depends on how contracts are awarded among these …rms.
To understand the results in Proposition 4 above, it is important to …rst recall that as a …rm's contracts go up, its pro…t-maximizing price (weakly) goes down. In turn, given that a low price makes it relatively more attractive for an uncontracted non-price-setter to become the price-setter, the equilibrium in which the contracted …rm sets the price might disappear. By the opposite logic, the contracted …rm now …nds it more appealing to be the non-price-setter, so that if no other …rm has incentives to deviate, there can now appear new equilibria involving lower prices. These e¤ects are illustrated in Figures 1 to 4 .
If all contracts are awarded to the …rm with 'high' market power, as in part (i), contracts (weakly) reduce prices with respect to the no-contracts case. This holds true regardless of whether the equilibrium in which the contracted …rms sets the price disappears (Figure 1) , and regardless of whether new equilibria arise (Figure 3 ), given that in any case the remaining equilibria result in lower prices.
The above conclusion may be reversed when all contracts are awarded to the …rm with 'low' market power, as in part (ii). In this case, it is still true that contracts (weakly) reduce prices when the …rm with 'low'market power sets the price. However, prices might go up when such equilibrium disappears (for x i x 0 i ). Given that the equilibrium price will then be set by …rms with higher pro…t-maximizing prices, contracts in this case may result in (weakly) higher prices as compared to the no-contracts case (Figure 2 ). 31 Last, if contracts are awarded to …rms with 'no market power', as in part (iii), contracts simply have no e¤ect as such …rms behave as price-takers with or without contracts ( Figure 4) . 3 1 The cases in which …rms 1 < n < i hold contracts are similar to case (ii) in the Proposition. There exists x 0 n 2 (0; q c n ) such that allocating contracts xn < x 0 n to …rm n leads to (weakly) lower prices because the equilibrium at which …rm n sets the price still exists. However, contracts xn x 0 n eliminate such equilibrium, with some of the remaining equilibria leading to either higher or lower prices. Hence, the e¤ects of contracts in these cases depend on equilibrium selection, but the anti-competitive e¤ects cannot be ruled out.
To conclude, when contracts are allocated to …rms with market power, an increase in contract volume does not always lead to price reductions. Indeed, an increase in contract volume may lead to (weakly) higher prices whenever such an increase in contracts destroys the equilibrium in which the contracted …rm sets the price (Figures 1 to 3 ).
[INSERT FIGURES 1-4 AROUND HERE]
Interestingly, note that the classi…cation of …rms as having either 'high', 'low' or 'no' market power, and hence the e¤ect of forward contracts on prices, depends on several factors, including …rms' cost functions, …rms'sizes and, in general, the degree of …rms'asymmetries. Large asymmetries, such that only one …rm has market power at the no-contracts case, lead to a clear-cut policy conclusion:
the dominant …rm should be forced to hold contracts; getting contract volume wrong in this case is not very costly, as contracts would in any case be e¤ective. To the contrary, mild asymmetries among …rms (particularly so, between the …rms with 'high'and 'low'market power) might give rise to the anti-competitive e¤ects identi…ed in Proposition 4. It is in these cases when the regulator should be most cautious when deciding on contract volume and its distribution among …rms. However, it is also in these cases when contracts can potentially play a more crucial role, as encouraging …rms with 'medium'and 'low'market power to purchase such contracts may counterbalance the market power of the dominant …rms.
Irregular Cases
In this section, we assess whether the results we have derived so far are robust to some …rms holding fewer contracts than their competitive quantities while others hold more, i.e., x n < q c n for some …rms and x n q c n for others. Similar results to those found under the regular cases regarding equilibrium characterization, equilibrium existence and multiplicity, also arise under the irregular cases as long as in equilibrium all …rms are either net-sellers or have a balanced position, i.e., as long as x i q i holds for all …rms. The intuition is simple: if all …rms'net-positions at the candidate equilibrium have the same sign (or no sign at all), they face no con ‡ict of interests among them. In particular, none of the non-price-setters wants to deviate in order to reduce the price and, given that Proposition 1 applies, none of them wants to change its production as they are all producing the same as if they were bidding at marginal costs.
In contrast, the properties of the equilibria in which net-sellers and net-buyers coexist might drastically di¤er from those derived under the regular cases, as the coexistence of net-buyers and net-sellers gives rise to a con ‡ict of interests among them. Several implications follow from this.
First, as already argued, there is no guarantee that the non-price-setters produce e¢ ciently, given that Proposition 1 need not hold for the net-buyers. To see this, consider for instance a duopoly facing inelastic demand, D = 6; with costs c 1 = f(0; 1) ; (1; 5) ; (c; 6)g ; c 2 = f(0; 1) ; (c; 6)g ; where c > 1; and contracts x 2 = 6 > q c 2 = 1 and x 1 = 0 < q c 1 = 5: The bid pro…le b 1 = (z; 1) ; p R ; 6 and b 2 = f(0; 5) ; (z; 6)g ; where 1 < z < c; constitutes a Nash equilibrium at which …rm 1 is the pricesetter and …rm 2, despite being a non-price-setter, produces with units whose marginal costs exceed p (in particular, q 2 = 5 whereas c 2 (5) = c > z = p ), thus failing to satisfy Proposition 1.
Second, the conditions that guarantee existence of competitive equilibria are more stringent in the irregular than in the regular cases (Proposition 2). On the one hand, the fact that all …rms but one can exhaust competitive demand does not guarantee that the equilibrium will be competitive, as the net-buyers face incentives to deviate by reducing the price rather than by increasing it. On the other hand, neither the existence of several price-setters implies that the equilibrium must be competitive, nor the existence of a unique price-setter implies that the equilibrium must be noncompetitive. To see this, consider again the market structure described above. The strategies b 0 1 = (z; 5) ; p R ; 6 and b 0 2 = f(z; 6)g generate a Nash equilibrium in which both …rms are pricesetters and still p = z > 1 = p c : This equilibrium hinges on a property which holds more generally under the irregular cases, namely, that it is not possible to rule out payo¤-relevant ties at the margin.
Whereas the net-buyers weakly prefer to tie so as to avoid productive losses, the net-sellers might be capacity-constrained to bene…t from the increased demand they would face if they were to break the tie by reducing their bids.
Third, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium bidding must now take into account not only that deviations up and deviations down might be pro…table, but also that the candidate stop-out price can be above, equal or below the competitive price. At an equilibrium with p p c ; condition 3) in Theorem 1 has to be strengthened so that N P S j (p ) P S j (p j ) holds, not only for all …rms j 6 = i with p P S j (b j ) > p (as in the regular cases), but also for all …rms j 6 = i which satisfy x i + x j > q i + q j . In words, the modi…ed condition 3) requires that deviations by non-price-setters with pro…t-maximizing prices below p be ruled out, but only when the deviant remains a net-buyer after deviating to a lower price. To see this, note that the quantity sold by the deviant after a price reduction would at least be equal to q i x i + q j ; 32 so that a …rm with x j q i x i + q j would become a net-seller and hence would no longer bene…t from lowering the price. Similar arguments explain why an equilibrium with p p c requires N P S j (p ) P S j (p j ) to hold for all j 6 = i with p P S j (b j ) < p ; but also for all j 6 = i satisfying x i + x j < q i + q j . Fourth, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes pervades the irregular cases. As in the regular cases, some of this multiplicity can be avoided by appealing to Pareto dominance arguments. In Finally, there is one last feature that also distinguishes the irregular from the regular cases.
Namely, in contrast to Proposition 3, equilibria in which the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs may fail to exist under the irregular cases, given that marginal cost bidding exacerbates …rms' con ‡ict of interests. As compared to the case in which the non-price-setters bid above marginal costs, marginal cost bidding by the non-price-setters makes it easier for an over-contracted …rm to set a low price: it reduces the amount of output that it has to bid below marginal costs in order to drive the stop-out price below the competitive one, rendering such a deviation more attractive.
Since …rms with fewer contracts may …nd it pro…table to set a much higher price, an equilibrium in which the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs may thus fail to exist. 33 To illustrate some of the features discussed above, we conclude this section by extending the illustrative example presented in Section 3 (two symmetric …rms with costs c n = f(0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (2; 3)g ; n = 1; 2, facing inelastic demand, D = 3). Since q c n = 1:5, let x 1 = 0 < x 2 2 (2; 3] to allow for a (relevant) irregular case to emerge. 34 Focusing on Pareto undominated Nash equilibria, the following bid pro…le generates a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the stop-out price, which is determined by the …rst (second) step in …rm 1's (…rm 2's) bid function. More precisely, we claim that the following bid pro…le constitutes a Nash equilibrium,
where z 2 [2 (3 x 2 ) ; 2]. Since D = 3; the resulting outcome is q 1 = 1 > x 1 ; q 2 = 2 < x 2 and
; 2]; …rm 1 is net-seller and price-setter, and …rm 2 is net-buyer and non-pricesetter (note that …rm 2 is marginal as it is bidding one step at z; but it is not dispatching it).
Equilibrium pro…ts are
To check that …rm 1 is best-responding to b 2 ; note that for any strategy b The equilibria constructed above yield a continuum of prices p = z 2 [2 (3 x 2 ) ; 2] : They are thus not outcome equivalent despite the fact that …rm 1 is the price-setter under all of them. They arise because …rm 2, which is a net-buyer, strategically bids at z so as to 'cap' the price set by …rm 1, by o¤ering some of its output below marginal costs. These equilibria might result in prices below, at or above the competitive price, and might also involve productive ine¢ ciencies by the non-price-setter (i.e., there is a second source of productive ine¢ ciency on top of the price-setter withholding pro…table production). Such multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, which is reminiscent of Wilson's results, only arises in the presence of forward contracts.
Interestingly enough, the solution is continuous in the amount of contracts held by …rm 2, which enlarge the set of equilibrium prices: when x 2 ! 2; p = 2 is the unique equilibrium price (which 3 3 Since there is complete information, Equilibrium existence can nevertheless be guaranteed .by appealing to Reny's better reply security (see Corollary 5.2 to Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999)): due to the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule, bidders' payo¤s are secure and their sum is upper semi-continuous, so that an equilibrium always exists. Note further that existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium follows from Corollary 14 to Theorem 6 in Jackson and Swinkels (2005) as the multi-unit uniform-price auction analyzed here satis…es assumption 8'in their paper (see page 122). 3 4 Even though x2 2 [1:5; 2] would also belong to the irregular cases, in Section 3 we already showed that at the unique equilibrium outcome, both …rms'net-positions have the same sign and hence face no con ‡ict of interests.
coincides with the one reported in Section 3 for x 2 2), while when x 2 = 3; any price p 2 [0; 2] can be sustained in equilibrium. Last, one cannot derive a general Pareto ranking among the multiple equilibria: the price-setter is strictly better-o¤ at the equilibrium with the highest price (whose outcome is the same as when the non-price-setter bids at marginal costs); however, that is precisely the worst equilibrium from the non-price-setter's point of view.
To conclude, whereas under the regular cases any potential multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes must derive from the coexistence of equilibria in which di¤erent …rms act as price-setters, the irregular cases lead to a continuum of equilibria even when conditioning on the identity of the pricesetter. Some of these equilibria might involve allocative ine¢ ciencies due to either monopoly or monopsony power, but they might also lead to productive ine¢ ciencies that cannot be ruled by
Pareto dominance. From a policy point of view, the analysis of the irregular cases again points out at a similar conclusion as the one above, but for a di¤erent reason: more is not always better since an increase in contract volume widens up the range of ine¢ ciently low price equilibria. Furthermore, an increase in some …rms'forward contracts commitments above their competitive output implies that the regulator loses all control as to which equilibria will be played, therefore running the risk that a particularly welfare detrimental equilibrium will be chosen.
Simulating the Impact of Forward Contracts
We next apply the theoretical model to simulate equilibrium bidding behavior and market outcomes in the Spanish electricity market during 2005. The aim is to illustrate with real data the strategic e¤ects of contracts that we have described in Section 5. Appendix B contains details on the Spanish electricity market as well as on the procedures we have followed to compute …rms'marginal costs.
We have considered alternative scenarios regarding total contract volume and its distribution across …rms. In particular, focusing on the equilibria in which only the two main …rms (Endesa and Iberdrola) are price-setters, we have computed both the competitive as well as the equilibrium market outcomes under the no-contracts case and the cases in which either Endesa (END) or Iberdrola (IB)
hold contracts, ranging from 1 to 8 GWs. 35;36 Table 2 reports the markups that result from comparing the simulated equilibrium price to the price that would arise in a competitive market (as suggested in Borenstein et al. ( 2002) ). 37 Markups are computed at four demand levels (expressed in percentiles), under the no-contracts case and under the cases in which Endesa has contracted either 2 or 5 GWs, and Iberdrola has contracted either 6 or 8 GWs (results for all other cases are qualitatively similar). By comparing the markups across 3 5 Since the simulations are conducted on an hourly basis over a year, there are at least 8,760 and at most (if both …rms act as price-setters) 17,520 equilibrium market outcomes under each of the 17 cases considered, plus the 8,760 competitive outcomes (these are the same regardless of whether …rms hold contracts or not)-adding up to over 300,000 simulated market outcomes in total. Simulations have been produced by ENERGEIA, a simulation software developed by the authors. 3 6 To have an idea of what this range of contract cover meant for …rms over their total capacity, let us note that Endesa's and Iberdrola's total capacity in 2005 was almost 11 GWs and 8.5 GWs, respectively. Table 4 in Appendix B provides information on …rms'total capacity and technology mix. 3 7 We have chosen to report these markups rather than prices for clarity. Nevertheless, note that both markups and prices illustrate identical results to the extent that the competitive price is the same regardless of which …rm sets the price and regardless of the level of contracting. for four demand levels (the year's peak load, and the 75%, 50% and 25% demand percentiles). The results are divided in columns, depending on the identity of the price-setter. A table entry is left empty if, for the associated demand level and contract volumes, there is not an equilibrium in which such a …rm behaves as price-setter. An asterisk denotes that the equilibrium has changed with respect to the no-contracts case.
…rms at the no-contracts case (…rst two columns in Table 2 ), we can readily verify that Endesa's pro…t-maximizing price exceeds that of Iberdrola's for all demand levels considered, except for peak load, at which both pro…t-maximizing prices coincide.
Let us …rst consider the e¤ects of contracts when awarded to the …rm with the high pro…t-maximizing price, Endesa. First, contracts may reduce Endesa's pro…t-maximizing price as a pricesetter; this is, for instance, the case when Endesa contracts 2 GWs and demand is at its 75% or 50% percentile. Second, contracts may give rise to a new equilibrium in which Iberdrola sets a lower price; this is the case when Endesa contracts either 2 or 5 GWs and demand is at its 50%
percentile. Last, contracts may eliminate certain equilibria at which Endesa sets the price; this is the case when Endesa contracts 5 GWs for all demand levels. Therefore, contracts by Endesa have (weakly) pro-competitive e¤ects.
However, such a conclusion is reversed when contracts are awarded to the …rm with the low pro…t-maximizing price, Iberdrola. More speci…cally, contracts by Iberdrola have (weakly) anticompetitive e¤ects when they destroy the low-price equilibrium outcomes. This is the case when Iberdrola contracts either 6 or 8 GWs and demand is at its 75% percentile.
The e¤ects of contracts reported so far vary with the demand level. For example, whereas at very high or very low demand levels contracts barely have any e¤ect on equilibrium outcomes, their e¤ect for intermediate demand levels can go in either direction depending on contract volume and contract allocation. In real markets, since demand changes over time while contract volumes remain …xed, the overall e¤ect of contracts will depend on the relative occurrence of periods in which contracts are either pro-competitive or anti-competitive. Therefore, with illustrative purposes, we have assessed the e¤ect that contracts would have had on the Spanish electricity prices during 2005 by computing total payments to producers over the year. Note on Table 3 : Total payments to producers under the competitive outcome are 9,599 Me; the minimum value under the no-contracts case is 11,422 Me, while the maximum is 11,728 Me. The table reports how these …gures change when forward contracts are introduced. Given that there might be multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, the Min and the Max columns report the minimum and maximum change in total payments.
the minimum and the maximum change in payments. Under all contract cases, total payments to generators go down, thereby indicating that the pro-competitive e¤ects of contracts seem to dominate over the anti-competitive ones. However, the anti-competitive e¤ects can also be inferred from these …gures as they account for the non-monotonic relationship between payments to producers and total contract volume. For instance, such non-monotonicity arises when Iberdrola's contracts are increased above 6 GWs, when savings are reduced from 200 Me to either 169 Me or 171 Me.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of forward contract commitments (or more generally, the impact of exogenous vertical commitments) on the performance of spot markets in a model that tries to capture the essential institutional and structural features of electricity markets. Instead of assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition, we have tried to model the actual market rules that govern most electricity markets in practice. In particular, we have assumed that …rms compete by submitting discrete supply functions. Furthermore, we have put no restrictions on the market demand function -which could be either downward-sloping or price-inelastic,-or the …rms' cost functions -which could result in either constant or step-wise increasing marginal costs, and could be symmetric or asymmetric across …rms. Thus, the model is ‡exible enough so as to make it comparable with other more stylized models, at the same time as it allows for all degrees of complexity. Indeed, we have used it to simulate real electricity market outcomes in order to provide an order of magnitude for the model predictions.
We …nd that forward contracts play a key role in shaping equilibrium market outcomes. To start with, forward contracts determine the set of weakly-dominated strategies, thus potentially ruling out equilibria that would exist without contracts, or giving rise to new equilibria that only exist with contracts. Indeed, we show that the e¤ects of contracts on equilibrium existence are crucial.
If contracts are awarded to …rms with strong incentives to exercise market power (i.e., typically the large …rms and/or those facing relatively ine¢ cient rivals), forward contracts may destroy the equilibria at which such …rms set prices. Since the surviving equilibria involve lower prices, forward contracts are unambiguously pro-competitive. However, the contrary occurs if contracts are awarded to …rms with weak but yet some market power. In particular, contracts might destroy the low price equilibria, and hence have anti-competitive e¤ects. Allocating contracts to …rms with no market power has no e¤ects on equilibrium existence, and it is thus irrelevant as far as market outcomes are concerned. The e¤ects of contracts on equilibrium existence also suggest that more is not always better. That is, if an increase in contract volume destroys the equilibrium at which the contracted …rm sets the price, more contracts might lead to higher prices.
From a policy perspective, our analysis thus implies that forward contracts should be awarded in ways that align all …rms'interests by (virtually) reducing their asymmetries. Paradoxical though it may seem, it is as important to mitigate the large …rms' incentives to increase prices as it is to enhance those of smaller competitors. This could be achieved by encouraging the medium to small …rms in the industry to act as counterparts of the forward contract commitments imposed on the dominant producers. Similarly, restricting certain …rms from entering into these contracts can be misplaced. 38 Regarding contract volume, forcing …rms to hold too few or too many forward contracts might be at best ine¤ective. Since the optimal contract volume ultimately depends on …rms'cost structures and demand, it should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Extending these conclusions to the analysis of vertical integration would imply that vertical mergers involving large upstream competitors would be pro-competitive, while vertical mergers involving smaller upstream …rms might be anti-competitive, particularly so when the merging party is a large downstream …rm.
We have focused on exogenously given contracts since we believe, in line with Bushnell et al. (2008) , that many "vertical arrangements [in electricity markets] are better understood and can reasonably be considered to be exogenous." Still, a further step of the analysis would be to allow for more general types of contracts by investigating the incentives to sign new contracts and hence their endogenous distribution across …rms. The current paper provides the needed …rst step to perform such an analysis.
To conclude, even though our analysis has been inspired by the workings of electricity markets, we believe that its implications have broader applicability. Since the most relevant features of our model are not unique to electricity markets, similar analyses could be applied to other contexts. Indeed, there are several other markets in which forward contracts and auctions coexist (e.g. Treasury markets, gas markets, etc.), or markets which are organized in ways that make auction theory useful for understanding …rms'strategic behavior (Klemperer (2003) ).
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Let us …x the bid functions submitted by …rms other than n at b n ;
and assume …rm n follows the strategyb n ; under which there is at least one step to the right of x n at prices below marginal costs. For the sake of exposition, but without any loss of generality, let us assume that this happens at only one steps such that x n q ns 1 . Next, we show thatb n is weakly-dominated by the strategy b 0 n ; which replicatesb n except for quantities in (q ns 1 ; q ns ] as these are now o¤ered at marginal costs. Letb (respectively, b 0 ) denote the bid pro…le b n ; b n (respectively, (b 0 n ; b n )). We …rst note that the equilibrium price underb is no larger than under b 0 asb n b 0 n while b n is the same under both pro…les. Consequently,p p 0 : 39 Trivially, if either p = p 0 p ns 1 orp = p 0 p ns+1 hold, the two strategies give …rm n the same pro…ts. We focus next in the remaining possibilities. If demand is price-inelastic, we must havep < p 0 andq n = q 0 n > x n ; if demand is downward-sloping, we havep p 0 andq n > q 0 n > x n . Pro…ts at the two pro…les are given by
Thus,
as eitherq n = q 0 n so that the integral is zero while [q 0
Since pro…ts under b 0 are no smaller than underb, the statement follows.
(ii) Let us …x the bid functions submitted by …rms other than n at b n ; and assume that …rm n follows the strategyb n ; under which there is at least one step to the left of x n at prices above marginal costs. Compare the pro…ts made by …rm n underb n and b 0 n ; with the latter constructed as above, i.e., it replicatesb n except for quantities in (q ns 1 ; q ns ] ; with q ns x n ; as these are now o¤ered at marginal costs. The equilibrium price underb is no smaller than under b 0 asb n b 0 n while b n is the same under both pro…les. Consequently,p
holds, the two strategies give …rm n the same pro…ts. Sincep = p 0 =p ns cannot hold, the only remaining possibility isp =p ns > p 0 so that x n q 0 n >q n if demand is downward-sloping and x n q 0 n =q n if demand is price-inelastic. Thus, unless demand is inelastic and it happens to be such that x n = q 0 n =q n so that pro…ts under the two strategies are identical, the di¤erence in pro…ts at the two pro…les is
as either the integral is strictly positive or the second term, [x n q n ] [p p 0 ] ; is strictly positive.
Since pro…ts under b 0 are no smaller than underb, the statement follows. 3 9 There is a knife-edge case with downward-sloping demand in whichp > p 0 : This only occurs if demand cuts aggregate supply generated byb atpn but does not intersect aggregate supply generated by b 0 ; so that the price falls down to the price at the previous step. In this case, however, the strategybn is weakly dominated by one that moves the price for quantities in (xn;qns 1) above marginal costs so that there is market clearing and hence a new price that exceedsp; as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since we must show q j q j (p ); assume by contradiction that there is an equilibrium at which some …rm j; j 6 = i; for which q j < q j (p ) ; generate a stop-out price p 0 ; and a quantity q 0 j for …rm j: Since q 0 j > q j (the deviant's quantity replaces part of …rm i's marginal output), the di¤erence in …rm j's pro…ts is given by:
There are two cases to consider: (a) If p 0 = p , then the di¤erence in pro…ts is positive: the second term of the above equation is positive by de…nition of q j (p ) as p > c j (q) for any positive q < q 0 j q j (p ) ; whereas the …rst term can be made arbitrarily small by taking small enough.
(b) If p 0 = p ; the deviant now sells the additional output q j (p ) q j at a price above its marginal costs and thus gets more pro…ts. Since the deviation is pro…table, we reach a contradiction which proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 3. To show q j q j (p ) for all j 6 = i; assume for the sake of contradiction that there is some …rm j for which q j > q j (p ) holds in equilibrium. By weak-dominance arguments, it must be the case that q j x j as it could not otherwise bid below marginal costs to dispatch q j > q j (p ). It hence follows that q j > x j su¢ ces for q j q j (p ) to hold. To show that q j = x j or q k < q ks for some marginal …rm k; k 6 = j; are also su¢ cient conditions to ensure q j q j (p ), let q j (p ) < q j x j : Consider the deviation by …rm j of moving the original bid(s) for quantities in A; q j i above p (e.g. …rm j could bid such quantities at marginal costs). The di¤erence in …rm j's pro…ts is given by:
If q ks < q k let A = q j [q ks q k ] : At the resulting bid function pro…le b 0 the stop-out price remains p as j's dispatched output under b is replaced by …rm k, so that q 0 j < q j . Consequently, the …rst term in equation (5) is zero while the second is strictly positive (the deviant now reduces its output and therefore its losses), so that j (b 0 ) > j (b) : Since the deviation is pro…table, we have reached a contradiction as desired.
If q ks = q k for all marginal …rms k; k 6 = j; but q j = x j let A = q j q j (p ) : Now, …rm j's deviation implies a price increase, p 0 > p ; thus implying that the …rst term in equation (5) may be negative. However, as we can rewrite equation (5) as the sum of two integrals, recalling that
since c j (z) > p 0 for all z 2 q j (p ) ; q j i and hence for z 2
The deviation is again pro…table, reaching a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1. We must show that q j 2 h q j (p ); q j (p ) i for any non-price-setter …rm j: By appealing to Lemma 2 it follows that q j q j (p ) holds. Similarly, if q j > x j or if q k < q ks for some marginal …rm k; k 6 = j; then q j q j (p ) follows from Lemma 3. Thus q j 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) We …rst show that if D (p c ) min i P j6 =i q j (p c ) holds, then at any Nash equilibrium p = p c : Assume, by contradiction, that p > p c : Since p must be set by at least one …rm, assume that …rm i is a price-setter. By Lemma 2,
contradicting that …rm i is a price-setter. Since p = p c ; it follows that q n = q c n for all n; by Proposition 1: (ii) [Only if ] Assume, by contradiction, that there is a unique price-setter, while p = p c and q n = q c n for all n hold: Note that by de…nition of p c ; it must be the case that p c c n (q c n ) : For all the …rms that are not marginal such a condition is satis…ed with strict inequality, p c > c n (q c n ) ; so that q c n = q n (p c ). Moreover, there must be at least one marginal …rm for which such a condition is satis…ed with equality, p c = c n (q c n ) ; so that q c n < q n (p c ) as we have ruled out the cases under which there is no supply rationing at the competitive outcome. Two possibilities can emerge. ; …rm i would be selling q c i at a price below marginal costs, which is ruled out by weak-dominance. Alternatively, if c j (q c j ) < p c = c i (q c i ) ; both …rms must be dispatching their marginal steps as demand would not otherwise be covered,
The contradiction proves our claim.
[If ] If there were more than one price-setter while p > p c ; then q n q n (p ) for all n must hold by Lemma 2. Since q n (p ) q n (p c ) q c n ; then q n q c n for all n. If for at least one of them q n > q c n holds, then D(p )
an impossibility. Consequently, q n = q c n for all n: However, q n = q c n and p > p c can only hold simultaneously when q n = q n (p ) = q n (p c ) = q c n for all n; so that …rms are not rationed at the competitive outcome. A possibility which has been nevertheless ruled out.
Proof of Lemma 4. To show (i), recall that q j q j (p ) holds for all j 6 = i by Proposition 1.
is an increasing function of p as q N P S
; with strict inequality if p > p c . Thus,
Proof of Theorem 1.
[Only if ] Suppose that there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium b in which …rm i sets the price at p = p P S i (b i ) p c and …rms' payo¤s are P S i (p ) and N P S j (p ); i; j = 1; :::N; j 6 = i: If this is the case then Condition 1 follows from Proposition 1 and optimal behavior by the price-setter, and Conditions 2 and 3 follow trivially from the de…nition of Nash equilibrium.
[If ] To show that no …rm pro…ts by deviating from strategies that satisfy Conditions 1 to 3, consider …rst the non-price-setters j; j 6 = i: By Condition 1, they do not want to change their quantity given p : Thus, the only relevant deviations are those that allow the …rm to become the price-setter at a price above p . Deviating to a price equal to or lower than p is not pro…table as by Lemma
Hence, those …rms j with p P S j (b j ) p will trivially not deviate. Those …rms j with p P S j (b j ) > p will not deviate as N P S j (p ) P S j (p P S j ) holds by Condition 3. Last, by Condition 1 the price-setter is already maximizing its pro…ts over its residual demand, so that any deviation by …rm i must imply becoming a non-price-setter at a lower price, p < p ; while increasing its production to q N P S i (p). Such deviation is not pro…table by Condition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We …rst prove part (ii). Letb and b 0 be two equilibrium bid pro…les such that that underb all …rms j bid at marginal costs (i.e.,b i = c i ) while …rm i sets the price at p =p; whereas under b 0 at least one …rm j, j 6 = i does not bid at marginal costs while …rm i sets the price at p = p 0 . Trivially, ifp = p 0 both equilibria are outcome-equivalent as prices are the same and …rms'j 6 = i quantities must also coincide since they must satisfy Proposition 1. Ifp > p 0 then any non-price-setter preferŝ b to b 0 as shown in Lemma 4. This is also the case for the price-setter: if p 0 = p c ; the price-setter prefersp to p 0 by revealed preference, as it could have chosen to also bid at marginal costs to set the price at p c ; but it chose to setp > p c instead; if p 0 > p c ; then
where the …rst inequality follows from the fact thatp is an equilibrium underb which requires that p 2 arg max p P S i p;b i ; and the second equality from the fact that p 0 is an equilibrium under b 0 so that Proposition 1 holds and hence q j p 0 ;
Since all …rms are better-o¤ atb = (b i ; c i ), it is the Pareto-dominant one, as claimed.
Ifp < p 0 ; we show next that p 0 is also an equilibrium underb: For the sake of contradiction assume it is not so that one of the three conditions in Theorem 1 must fail to hold. Since …rms j 6 = i bid at marginal costs, they are trivially producing optimally conditionally on being non-pricesetters; furthermore, given that the non-price-setters do not want to become the price-setter under p;p < p 0 ; the same must hold true under p 0 so that Condition 3 of Theorem 1 is satis…ed. As p 0 is an equilibrium under b 0 then for any p p 0 such that
where the …rst equality and second inequality follow from the fact that p 0 is an equilibrium under b 0 (so that Conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 1 hold) and the last equality from the fact that the non-price-setters' pro…ts are independent of their rivals' strategies. Hence, since this implies that Condition 2 of Theorem 1 does also hold, it must then be the case that
where the last inequality from the fact that p i . Since such units are dispatched underb i bidding them below marginal costs is ruled out by weak-dominance so that q i p; b 0 i < q i p;b i cannot hold in equilibrium. Since integral above cannot be positive we ran into a contradiction proving that p 0 >p must also be an equilibrium when …rms j bid at marginal costs as it satis…es the three conditions in Theorem 1. Last, by the same arguments as above, the equilibrium with p 0 Pareto dominates the equilibrium withp:
We now prove (i). The [If ] part is trivial, so we omit it. [Only If ] For the sake of contradiction, suppose that the equilibrium in which …rm i is the price-setter at p = p P S i (c i ) while all other …rms bid at marginal costs does not exist. This must be because Condition 3 fails to hold, given that Conditions 1 and 2 trivially hold. If there is multiple pro…t-maximizing prices any other price p 2 arg max P S i (c i ) < p P S i (c i ) would also violate Condition 3, given that p P S i (c i ) is assumed to be the largest one. To show that there does not exist any other equilibrium in which …rm i is the price-setter, argue by contradiction and suppose that some other bid pro…le b 0 constitutes an equilibrium. If p 0 < p P S i (c i ) then Condition 3 will again fail to hold contradicting that it constitutes an equilibrium, whereas if p 0 > p P S i (c i ) then p 0 must also be sustainable when the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs as shown in (ii). The contradiction proves the claim.
Proof of Corollary 1.
For ease of exposition, let us index …rms by their pro…t-maximizing prices when rivals bid at marginal costs, i.e., p P S n (c n ) p P S n+1 (c n+1 ). We prove this result by constructing a bid pro…le that always constitutes an equilibrium, in which …rm 1 (i.e., the …rm with the highest pro…t-maximizing price) is the price-setter. Assume that …rms j 6 = 1 bid at marginal costs while …rm 1 uses strategy b 1 constructed as follows: any q 1 < x 1 is bid in at marginal cost, whereas quantities q 1 x 1 are split into two sets, quantities q 1 2 (x 1 ;q 1 ) are all bid in at p P S 1 (c 1 ) whereq 1 = inf q : c 1 (q 1 ) p P S 1 (c 1 ) x 1 ; and quantities q 1 2 (q 1 ; K 1 ) are bid in at marginal costs. Trivially, the equilibrium price under the proposed pro…le equals p P S 1 (c 1 ) : Note that a price p > p P S 1 (c 1 ) is impossible since at any such price p all …rms are bidding at marginal costs; similarly, if p < p P S 1 (c 1 ) …rm 1 dispatches no more than x 1 ; implying that …rm 1's pro…ts would be less than x 1 , but P S 1 p P S 1 P S 1 (p c ) x 1 given that x 1 < q c 1 : Now, since p = p P S 1 (c 1 ) and q j = q N P S j (p ) for all j 6 = 1, Condition 1 of Theorem 1 holds. Condition 2 also holds since if …rm 1 deviates to become a non-price-setter, the price would go down to p c ; and
(p c ) = P S 1 (p c ) P S 1 p P S
1
: Finally, Condition 3 follows from the de…nition of p P S 1 (c 1 ) as p P S 1 (c 1 ) p P S j (c j ) for all j 6 = 1.
Proof of Corollary 2. Assume that the equilibrium in which …rm i is the price-setter exists so that N P S j p P S i P S j p P S j for all j 6 = i. Since by Lemma 4, the non-price-setters' pro…ts are increasing in p; it follows that N P S j p P S i n N P S j p P S i for any n = 1; ::; i 1: Consequently, N P S j p P S i n N P S j p P S i P S j p P S j implies that the equilibria in which …rms f1; :::; i 1g are the price-setters also exist. The remaining part of the proof follows the reversed arguments.
Proof of Lemma 5. Part (i) follows from the fact that p P S n (x) is equal for all n; it constitutes the unique equilibrium price, and it is (weakly) decreasing in x. As x approaches q c ; productive e¢ ciency is (weakly) greater because …rms'market shares converge and marginal cost functions are (weakly) increasing.
To prove part (ii), suppose that contracts are not identically distributed among …rms, x 1 < x 2 ::: x n ; so that x 1 < P n xn N = x: Since all …rms are symmetric in all other respects, p P S 1 (x 1 ) p P S j (x j ) for all j 6 = 1; furthermore, existence of an equilibrium with p P S 1 (x 1 ) is guaranteed by Corollary 1. When contracts are identically distributed, the highest equilibrium price is p P S 1 (x) : Since for x 1 < x; p P S 1 (x 1 ) p P S 1 (x), the highest equilibrium price is (weakly) higher if contracts are not identically distributed. It follows that productive e¢ ciency at the highest price equilibrium is (weakly) lower under any asymmetric contract distribution.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us …rst introduce the following piece of notation. For x n x j = 0; let x 0 n be the smallest amount of contracts held by …rm n for which the equilibrium in which …rm n sets the price does not exist. Formally, (i) By construction, p P S 1 (0) is the highest candidate equilibrium price at the no-contracts case, and Corollary 1 guarantees that it is an equilibrium price. Since p P S 1 (x 1 ) is weakly decreasing in x 1 ; the highest equilibrium price when x 1 > 0 is max p P S 1 (x 1 ) ; p P S 2 (0) p P S 1 (0) : Hence, the highest equilibrium price is (weakly) higher at the no-contracts case. To show that the lowest equilibrium price is also (weakly) higher at the no-contracts case, let p P S i (0) be the lowest equilibrium price when x 1 = 0: By Corollary 2, any price p P S n (0) p P S i (0) ; for 1 < n i; must also be an equilibrium price when x 1 = 0 as well as when x 1 > 0. The incentives of all …rms other than …rm 1 do not depend on x 1 , whereas …rm 1's incentives to deviate from an equilibrium in which …rm n sets the price are decreasing in x 1 ; hence, if no …rm deviates from p P S n (0) when x 1 = 0; no …rm will deviate either when x 1 > 0. It thus follows that the lowest equilibrium price when x 1 > 0 can not be larger than p P S i (0) : Therefore, since the set of equilibrium prices is the same when x 1 = 0 or x 1 > 0, except (possibly) for the highest price, which is higher when x 1 = 0, and the lowest(s) price(s) which is (possibly) lower when x 1 > 0; contracts by …rm 1 only (weakly) reduce prices.
Let us now show that there can exist a non-monotonic relationship between contracts awarded to …rm 1 and equilibrium prices. Since p P S 1 (0) is an equilibrium price when x 1 = 0, while when x 1 = q c 1 it is not (since p P S 1 (q c 1 ) p c < p P S 2 (0), …rm 2 would trivially deviate from such a low price), there exists x 0 1 2 (0; q c 1 ] such that the equilibrium with p P S 1 (x 1 ) does not exist for all x 1 2 [x 0 1 ; q c 1 ] : Let p P S j (0) be the lowest equilibrium price when x 1 = x 0 1 : By Corollary 2, it must be the case that the costs of transporting coal from the nearest harbor where it is delivered to the plant where it is consumed. Lastly, each unit's generation capacity has been reduced by its estimated outage rate.
By aggregating the capacities of each …rm's thermal units in increasing marginal cost order, we have obtained estimates of …rms'thermal marginal cost curves for each day of the year.
Furthermore, we have assumed that the marginal costs of producing electricity with hydro and renewables equal zero. The production coming from such sources has therefore been added to the left of each …rm's thermal marginal costs curve in order to construct their overall marginal costs curves. We have chosen not to use actual data on hydro production, as it is already the result of …rms'strategic decisions. Instead, poundage hydro generation has been set to peak-shave demand on a monthly basis, taking into account maximum hydro ‡ows. 41 Both, run-of-river hydro as well as renewables'production, have been uniformly spread across time. Hydro stocks, run-of-river hydro ‡ows, and renewable energy, are monthly estimates of a representative year.
Demand has been assumed to be price-inelastic at the actual hourly demand levels that were ob- 
